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The British Expeditionary Force, 1914
The British Expeditionary Force arrived in France on 4 August, 1914, with a force of 2 Army corps, each made up of 2 infantry divisions with support units, and an array of cavalry units. Although supposedly based upon experience during the Boer war, in fact most of the lessons of that war had been discarded during infighting between two cliques. The BEF was initially lead by Field Marshal Sir John French who had commanded the Cavalry division during the 2nd Boer war and became part of the African clique under General Roberts, allowing his career to advance after Redver's Buller lost position.
Unfortunately for the BEF, French had been involved in one of the last successful cavalry lance charges in the war, and although he later used concentrated firing lines successfully, he was enamored with the potential of "cold steel" to settle the battlefield. As a result, though the BEF was professionally trained and lead, it was deficient in tactics to deal with modern war, just likes it French counterparts. The emphasis on the bayonet had another tragic consequences. During the Boer war the effectiveness of artillery and rapid-fire machine guns was shown conclusively, but French and other generals who came to power afterward were slow to innovate in this area. The British went to war considerably under-equipped with heavy canon and machine guns.
During the battle of the Frontiers, the BEF overcame deficiencies of leadership and equipment and fought very well. Field Marshall French tried to use his cavalry as mounted reserve infantry, a role that better suited than the original plan to use them as an attacking force, but poor coordination with the larger French units often squandered the results of British bravery. During the initial stages of the battle General Charles Lanrezac of the French Fifth Army felt that the British, being available only in two corps strength, should coordinate their actions closely with the French, while Field Marshall French felt that, for the same reason (the small size of the BEF) it was his responsible to act more independently and maintain an escape route should the French resistance fail. Part of this disagreement was not either leader's fault, the French needed to British to move into line against the rapidly lengthening German offensive to avoid it outflanking their left, while the British were acutely aware that there existed no reserves in England and if the bulk of the experienced army was lost, there would be no cadre to rebuild.
The problems were further made difficult by the personalities of French generals and the lack of pre-war coordinations. Few British officers were familiar with the ground over which they fought, did not know the French language (the assumption being that the language of the country being fought over and that of the biggest army should be the language of command), and the French highest command ranks, notably Joffre, were hardly the type of commander to take over a multiple nation military structure. In fact, the none of the best French generals could be said to be diplomatic, and Joffre was neither diplomatic, nor a good General. 1
The initial BEF organization would expand in the coming years to form a significant force, itself made up of multiple nations (including Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and India).
Footnote
1. The French eventually made an arrangement to have a poor General whose political skills were excellent, Foch, have overall command of the combined allied armies, while keeping nearly all of the strategic and tactical thinking in the hands of Philippe Pétain.
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